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Rural Access to Credit in Vermont
An Examination of Rural Vermont’s Access to Credit and Regulated Lenders in the Wake




This thesis examines rural Vermont’s access to credit in the context of historical bank
consolidation and in the wake of the subprime crisis. For the purposes of this study, “rural” is
defined using Rural-Urban Commuting Codes, calculated by the United States Department of
Agriculture. Access to credit is measured by proximity to lenders regulated by the Community
Reinvestment Act or to credit unions, as well as by loan application outcomes, specifically loan
origination and denial rates. Proximity to a regulated lender is measured by people per
depository institution, a metric created by the author, and is compared over a forty-year span
between 1980 and 2020. Loan application outcomes are measured from Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act data, using loan origination and denial rates by census tract in 2007 and 2017.
These years were chosen in order to compare loan application outcomes immediately before the
subprime crisis and in the decade which followed. The metrics calculated are then compared in
rural parts of the state to the rest of Vermont. A regression analysis is also included which
regresses loan application outcomes against a census tract’s status as rural, as well as other
factors which could contribute to its loan application outcomes. Ultimately, this study found that
rural parts of the state have reduced access to CRA-regulated lending institutions and credit
unions, have lower loan origination rates, and have higher loan denial rates. These indicate a
relative lack of access to credit in rural Vermont.
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As a country, the “wealth gap” has been a central focus of national discourse and policy goals for
decades. Though these discussions often include a variety of subjects and proposals, access to
credit has long been at the forefront of the economic equality conversation. Americans have
always experienced unequal access to credit, and these inequalities are often drawn
geographically. Decades of research and policy have examined access to credit through the lens
of racial discrimination and redlining, as these practices have critically undermined American
economic and credit equality. While these sorts of urban geographic credit problems are a major
barrier to economic equality, other geographic limitations play important roles in access to credit,
too. This paper takes this into account by examining rural access to credit in Vermont compared
to non-rural access. While some literature surrounding rural access to credit does exist, it is far
from extensive, and no rural-nonrural comparison has been done in the state of Vermont.
Trends in banking consolidation and an economy in the wake of the subprime crisis
makes an examination of lending practices in rural places relevant today. For decades, the
banking industry has been trending away from small, local banks in favor of larger banks. Today,
these larger banks control the vast majority of assets and originate more than half of America’s
loans, but are mostly headquartered in urban or suburban places. Not only does this mean that
most of the lending industry’s purchasing power is geographically distant from rural America,
literature such as that published by Ergungore (2010) shows that proximity to lending institutions
increases access to credit. A lending industry which has experienced a shift away from rural
America indicates a potential barrier in rural Americans’ credit access. Further, studies such as
those published by the Federal Reserve of Minneapolis (2017) and Cole (2020) show that urban
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America’s successful recovery from the subprime crisis relative to rural America’s has widened a
gap in loan application outcomes.
In this paper, an analysis of access to credit in rural and non-rural Vermont uses
proximity to a regulated lender and loan application outcomes as access to credit metrics.
“Rural” is measured using rural-urban commuting area (RUCA) codes published by the United
States Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service. The presence of regulated
lenders in Vermont’s least- and most-rural counties relative to the counties’ population is
examined. Mortgage application outcomes by census tract are examined in the years 2007 and
2017, using data obtained via the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act and published by the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. These outcomes are then compared in rural and
non-rural tracts. The years 2007 and 2017 were chosen in order to compare mortgage application
outcomes before and after the subprime crisis. Ultimately, the findings of this paper have
important implications for economic vitality and equality in Vermont, as well as in other states
with large rural populations.
II. Access to Credit And Relevant Legislation
A. A Brief History of Access to Credit
The history of lending in America is tied closely to the history of economic opportunity. Access
to credit means the possibility of owning a home, starting a business, or purchasing a car. The
modern middle class was built on credit, as cheap loans allowed families to move to the suburbs
following World War II (Hyman, 2011). In the mid-20th century Americans were buying
everything from homes to clothing on credit, refinancing as needed (Hyman, 2011). The practice
bolstered the post-war economy, as American consumerism pushed this country into the
forefront of economic growth. But while the benefits of lending built the middle class, credit also
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served as a divisive force. Postwar lending was characterized by discrimination, as African
Americans and women had substantially reduced access to credit, and a two-tiered lending
industry emerged which left poor Americans unable to utilize the same financial tools as
wealthier Americans.
The lack of credit access made it very difficult for Black Americans to leave their
neighborhoods, as well as for women to gain economic independence (Krippner, 2017). In 1967,
seventy percent of low-income consumers could only receive credit from low-income retailers
(Hyman, 2011). These retailers generally upcharged their products compared to high-income
retailers in wealthier neighborhoods, as the low-income retailers could not receive investment
from finance companies and had to borrow directly from the bank. Thus, poorer Americans had
to spend more on goods than wealthier Americans and were geographically limited in where they
could make credit-driven purchases. In an economy in which credit was a dominant purchasing
force, this left low-income Americans at a severe disadvantage.
B. The Introduction of the CRA
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) was passed in 1977 with the goal of increasing access
to credit for low- and moderate-income (LMI) Americans (Butcher & Muñoz, 2013). It did this
by compelling depository institutions to provide credit to LMI communities via the establishment
of LMI lending targets. These targets are enforced by an examination and rating system. CRA
ratings are considered when depository institutions apply for mergers or for opening a deposit
facility (Butcher & Muñoz, 2013). Three specific changes since 1977 have shaped the CRA into
its modern version. In 1989, CRA ratings were made public so as to provide more transparency
into the regulations. Publicizing CRA ratings put more scrutiny on the CRA analyses, which
brought about stricter enforcement. Prior to 1989, only 3% of depository institutions received
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low marks; in the years immediately following 1989, 10% received “needs to improve” or
“substantial noncompliance” (Macey & Miller, 1993). The 1989 amendments also required the
examining agency to write a written evaluation of each lending institution’s CRA compliance. In
1995, a more thorough examination was created for large depository institutions which made the
CRA examinations more objective. In 2005, another category, “intermediate small institutions,”
was created, finalizing the current system of three separate CRA evaluations which vary based
on the size of the depository institution evaluated (Butcher & Muñoz, 2013).
The actual enforcement of the Community Reinvestment Act is done by a combined
force of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), and the Office of the Comptroller Currency (OCC). These agencies
examine depository institutions’ lending practices within their “lending assessment areas,” or
areas in which the institution has an office, branch or ATM (Congressional Research Service,
2019). Differences in bank size definitions correspond to differences in CRA examinations.
“Small” banks are evaluated under the lending test, “intermediate small” depository institutions
are evaluated using the lending and investment tests, and “large” depository institutions are
subject to all three tests (Congressional Research Service, 2019). Ultimately, most depository
institutions pass their CRA examination. There are five possible grades which a depository
institution can receive from their examination: “Outstanding,” “High Satisfactory,” “Low
Satisfactory,” “Needs to Improve,” or “Substantial Noncompliance.”
Literature on the CRA’s impact on access to credit is rich. One study used data from the
Consumer Credit Panel (CCP) between 2004 and 2012 to quantify access to credit for those
living in low- or moderate-income census tracts compared to those who don’t. CCP data tracks
every individual with a credit report’s credit history from 1999 to the present (Butcher & Muñoz,
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2013). Although CCP data does not contain much information about individuals, it does contain
their location, making it possible to track credit outcomes by census tract. The study used the
FFIEC’s list of low- and moderate- income census tracts for the year 2000, and used census
tracts with median family incomes between 75% and 85% of their respective area median family
incomes (Butcher & Muñoz, 2013). A census tract with a median family income of 80% of the
national average is considered LMI, so this study looks at census tracts which are both slightly
above and slightly below the cutoff. Ultimately, the study found that census tracts which had
median family incomes just low enough to be considerate low- or moderate-income (thus, just
barely CRA eligible) had 9% more trades, or account activity (such as an originated mortgage,
student loan, etc.) than tracts with median family incomes just above the LMI threshold (Butcher
& Muñoz, 2013). Further, those census tracts which were CRA-eligible in this study had 7%
more individuals in the CCP database than census tracts with a median family income just high
enough to not be CRA-eligible (Butcher & Muñoz, 2013). This suggests that the “CRA effect” is
an increase in access to credit for low- and moderate-income census tracts.
III. Changes to Vermont In Recent Decades
Changes in the state of Vermont contextualize the findings of this paper. Over the last thirty to
fifty years, Vermont’s economy has changed dramatically. Although the state lagged behind the
rest of the country by many economic measures in the earlier half of the twentieth century,
Vermont began closing the gap in the 1950s (Bolduc & Kessel, 2008). One study published in
2008 found that per capita income in Vermont had grown to 95% of the national average. Yet,
this growth was not evenly distributed across the state. In 2006, per capita GDP was 62%, 80%,
and 83% of the national average in Essex, Orleans, and Caledonia counties, respectively. These
same counties were substantially closer to the national per capita income thirty-six years prior, in
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1970 (Bolduc & Kessel, 2008). Other metrics also point towards an uneven distribution of
economic growth in the state. By 2006, the Burlington labor market was responsible for 37% of
Vermont’s jobs, while it only accounted for 31% in 1978. This shows that, while Vermont’s
economy has improved in recent decades, and many parts of the state have caught up with and
exceeded national economic standards, its growth has been uneven and parts of the state were
left behind.
Another important change in Vermont has been the urbanization of the state and relative
decline of rural places. Since the eighties, Vermont has been converting agricultural land to
developed land at a relatively rapid rate. Between 1982 and 1997, agricultural land use dropped
by 174,000 acres, representing a 16% decrease. During the same period of time, there was a
74,800 acre increase in developed land, 31% of which came from previously agricultural land
(Bolduc & Kessel, 2008). Between 1982 and 2003, the proportion of land considered
“developed” increased by 60%, but Vermont’s population increased by only 19%, suggesting a
trend towards higher percentages of Vermonters living in urban places (Bolduc & Kessel, 2008).
Census data confirms this, as population density (measured in people per square mile) has
steadily increased in recent decades, from 55.5 in 1980 to 67.9 in 2010, with steady increases for
every decade in between (United States Census Bureau, 2010.).
IV. The Banking Industry and Rural Access to Credit
A. Banking Industry Consolidation
Changes in banking trends made Vermont’s lending industry very different by the end of the 20th
century, which changed Vermonters’ access to depository institutions and therefore to credit from
a mainstream financial institution. Throughout the second half of the nineties, banks were
consolidating en masse. Between 1990 and 1998 the number of FDIC-insured banking
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institutions in the United States dropped by 26.7%, representing a reduction of 3,288 banks. This
decrease was caused by the consolidation of the industry, as smaller banks merged with larger
ones. During this time, only 70 banks failed (Heiney, 2011). When the Riegle-Neal Act was
passed in 1994, which legalized inter-state mergers starting in 1997, the consolidation trend was
exacerbated. Riegle-Neal was intended to accelerate the rate at which banks consolidated. From
1998 to 2003, the number of banks in the United States decreased by 1,004, an 11.5% decrease
representing an average of 2.3% per year (Heiney, 2011). Thus, while the rate at which banks
consolidated began to slow, the overall trend continued.
Decades of consolidation within the banking industry has changed the landscape of the
lending industry for rural borrowers. Between 1990 and 2010, the number of FDIC-insured
lenders has dropped by almost 8,000 nationwide, and between 2000 and 2010 the number of
these institutions has dropped by 21% (Housing Assistance Council, 2015). Interestingly, 52% of
FDIC-insured lenders in 2012 were in small towns or rural places. However, this 52% held only
6% of assets under control by FDIC-insured depository institutions. This is because 85% of
rural-based banks are considered “small” by the CRA (Housing Assistance Council, 2015).
The national consolidation trend is mirrored in the experience of Vermont’s lending
industry, as expressed in Table 1 and visualized in Figure 1. The number of Vermont-chartered
banks has steadily declined since 1980, when there were 23 institutions. By 2019 there were only
6, representing a 73.91% decrease in the number of Vermont-chartered FDIC-insured banks
during that 49-year timespan (Vermont Department of Financial Regulation, 2019).
B. Rural Banking Industry
A considerable majority (85% in 2012) of banks headquartered in rural places are designated as
small under the CRA, making their examinations less thorough or frequent and allowing larger,
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non-rural banks to have more reach into rural credit markets. In 2012, the 20 largest depository
institutions held more than half of FDIC-insured assets, all of which were headquartered in urban
or suburban places (Housing Assistance Council, 2015). The primarily urban location of large
lenders means that borrowing in rural places frequently comes from non-rural sources. In fact,
despite 52% of depository institutions being rural, only 13% of mortgages came from rural
depository institutions in 2012 (Housing Assistance Council, 2015). That year, 70% of rural
mortgages from CRA-regulated institutions came from urban-based banks. “Shadow banking”
has become a growing source of credit as well. “Shadow banking,” defined as the unregulated
credit market, grew from 30% to 50% share of the residential housing market between 2007 and
2015 (Buchak, Matvos, Piskorski & Seru, 2017). The shadow banking market, which was worth
an estimated $71 trillion globally in 2012, is certainly an important force in the credit market,
although its relatively recent boom has made literature surrounding its impact in rural places thin
(Buchak, Matvos, Piskorski & Seru, 2017).
The relative size and financial power of larger, urban lenders gives them the opportunity
to be the main providers of credit in rural places, which has important implications for credit
access. In 2012, one-quarter of mortgages originated by depository institutions in rural census
tracts were distributed to people outside the lender’s assessment areas (Housing Assistance
Council, 2015). This means that banks are not being assessed under the CRA for much of the
lending that they do in rural areas. Despite the fact that 42% of rural and small town census tracts
were designated as high-credit-need in 2012, 29% of mortgage originations in rural and small
towns went to high-credit-need tracts that year. Further data suggests that the same year, about
one third of mortgages originated in rural census tracts were from institutions not regulated by
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the CRA, and that, prior to the Recession, this number was over 50% (Housing Assistance
Council, 2015).
C. Rural Access to Credit
Although the existing literature surrounding access to credit in rural places mostly revolves
around the higher costs which rural borrowers incur, there have been multiple studies which
examine the ability to obtain credit in rural places. One study published by Ergungore in 2010
used HMDA data to examine how distance between the lender and borrower impacts the
availability and terms of credit in low income neighborhoods. The paper studied low- and
moderate-income census tracts in Ohio in 2000, and used HMDA data from 2004-2007. Branch
locations were established using the FDIC’s Summary of Deposits. The study also set 24 control
variables, including the share of children in the census tract who live in a two-parent household,
the number of home-purchase loan applications per owner-occupied housing units, a binary
variable that indicates whether or not the census tract borders other states, etc. (Ergungore,
2010). Not only did this study find that the presence of a bank branch in a neighborhood has a
positive impact on loan originations and decreases the price of loans, these correlations become
stronger as distance to a bank branch decreases (Ergungore, 2010).
Another study conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (2017) looked at
loan denial rates in the United States and compared them to denial rates in a collection of six
upper-midwest states before and after the subprime crisis. The research was conducted with the
goal of finding discrepancies between loan application denial rates from urban and rural
applicants. The study found that rates of loan denial were higher in rural places both nationally
and in the ninth district. It also found that the differences between urban and rural denial rates
were exacerbated in the wake of the subprime crisis (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis,
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2017). Interestingly, this study also mapped the geographic extent of differences between
urban-rural loan denials. It found that these differences are particularly high in the midwest and
northern New England, with Vermont falling in the 3.5-4.5% difference range (Federal Reserve
Bank of Minneapolis, 2017).
A different study conducted by Cole (2020) for the U.S. Small Business Administration
examined the availability of credit to small businesses in rural versus urban census tracts. The
study conducted a series of tests, examining small business loan origination rates in five
categories organized by the loan amount, and included multivariate tests to find inconsistencies
in both the amount and number of small business loans originated for rural versus urban small
businesses. These tests were conducted using data from both before and after the subprime crisis
in an attempt to use the crisis as an exogenous shock and examine how outcomes change. The
study shows that, while small bank loan originations in all areas of the country dropped
dramatically in the wake of the crisis, recovery in rural areas remains much slower than in urban
areas. In 2016, average loan originations per capita both nationwide and in urban areas were 35%
below their 2007 peak, while rural areas were still 42% below their 2004 peak (Cole, 2020). This
points to rural small businesses’ continuing difficulty in obtaining credit relative to urban small
businesses in the wake of the subprime crisis.
V. Empirical Analysis of Access to Credit
When looked at in conjunction, the existing literature points towards a lack of access to credit for
rural Americans, which may be the result of a variety of factors. While the findings of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (2017) as well as Cole (2020) point towards differences in
loan origination and denial rates, Ergungor (2010) shows that proximity to bank locations is
correlated with low- and moderate-income individuals’ ability to obtain credit. These findings
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have huge implications for states with proportionally large rural populations, like Vermont. The
rest of this paper will answer the question: do rural Vermonters have the same access to credit as
non-rural Vermonters? By examining the distribution of banks by county as well as loan
application outcomes by census tract, my findings show that rural Vermonters have a reduced
access to credit when compared to urban Vermonters.
A. Data And Methodology
In this section, I examine the availability of loans to credit-seeking customers in rural and urban
areas in Vermont. Doing this requires an examination of banking in urban and rural Vermont, as
well as a study of lending in the state.
i. Comparing Rural and Urban Banking in Vermont
To examine banking, I use a series of resources from the Vermont Department of
Financial Regulation, the 1980 Annual Report of the Bank Commissioner of the State of
Vermont, and population data from the Census Bureau. Three resources from the Department of
Financial Regulation provided me with the current locations of CRA-regulated bank branches in
Vermont: the department’s lists titled “State and National Financial Institutions with Branches in
Vermont,” “Vermont Chartered Banks,” and “National Financial Institutions Domiciled in
Vermont.” This final list published by the Department of Financial Regulation did not include
Vermont branch locations of the listed institutions, so those locations were found via the
institutions’ websites.
The current locations of credit unions analyzed in this thesis were also found via the
state’s Department of Financial Regulation, in their resource titled “Credit Unions in Vermont
Ranked by Size.” This list also does not include credit union branch locations, and those were
obtained via the credit unions’ websites as well. The locations of financial institutions in
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Vermont in 1980 was taken from the 1980 Annual Report of the Bank Commissioner of the
State. This report, provided by the University of Vermont’s Howe Library, contains the locations
of all financial institutions in 1980 by town, as well as their size. Data regarding population by
county was taken from the census bureau’s website. From this, I was able to look at the
distribution of depository lending institutions in Vermont by county. Using population data from
the 2010 and 1980 census I calculated a “people per bank” statistic for each county in both years,
which is intended as a measurement of access to a lender’s branch location by county.
From this, I was able to measure the percentage change in people per bank over the
thirty-year span and compare this to the percentage change in population over the same period.
Including population growth is important because it contextualizes changes in the location of
banks with changes in the location of people. A decrease in banks which outpaces a decrease in
population, or even occurs during population growth, indicates that a community’s access to a
credit-providing institution is reduced.
ii. Comparing Rural and Urban Lending in Vermont
Analyzing Vermont’s lending industry involved the use of Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data
obtained via the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Rural-Urban Commuting Code data
obtained via the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and population and demographic data obtained
via the Census Bureau. HMDA data organizes loan application outcomes into six categories:
loans originated, approved but not accepted, denied, withdrawn, closed for incompleteness, and
purchased by institution. For the purposes of this thesis, “loans” are defined as mortgages
secured for the purpose of buying a residential property. It therefore excludes auto loans, many
business loans, and other forms of credit.
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The first part of my analysis involved organizing HMDA data from 2007 (the earliest
digitized HMDA data available) and 2017 by census tract and calculating the percentage of loan
applications with each outcome. I then used Rural-Urban Commuting codes to separate rural
census tracts from non-rural, thereby isolating loan application outcomes in 2007 and 2017 by
rural or not. Using this data, I was able to look at the distribution of rural census tracts when
Vermont tracts were ranked by percent loans originated and percent loans denied, providing a
look into where loan application outcomes stood in rural census tracts compared to the rest of the
state. After this, I ran regressions in stata, measuring a census tract’s status as rural against other
potential indicators of loan outcomes, specifically educational attainment, median household
income, and percentage of the tract’s population that is non-white. As stated earlier, data for
educational attainment and median household income was gathered from the 2010 census.
Mortgage origination rates used in these regressions were calculated using 2017 HMDA data.
The years 2007 and 2017 were chosen in order to present a picture of rural access to
credit before and after the subprime crisis. Literature discussing the subprime crisis’s impact on
rural credit is vast. Banks in rural America closed en masse, as the number of FDIC-insured
branch locations dropped 6% in rural places nationwide between 2008 and 2016 (National
Community Reinvestment Coalition, 2017). Small business lending, which was in steep decline
immediately following the recession, has been slow to recover in rural places, especially for
loans amounting to less than $250,000 (Cole, 2020). A gap in mortgage application denial rates,
which was virtually nonexistent before the subprime crisis, has been growing since 2008
(Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 2017). This literature indicates the potential impact of
the subprime crisis on differences in rural and urban credit access. Analyzing loan outcomes in
2007 and 2017 allows this potential impact to be addressed.
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B. Results of Empirical Analysis of Access to Credit
i. Distribution of CRA-Covered Depository Institutions
When analyzing access to credit in rural areas, the first issue to tackle is identifying which
census tracts are rural. The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service defines
Rural-Urban Commuting Area Codes each census year, which code census tracts on a scale of
one to ten. These codes, described below, are created using population density, urbanization, and
daily commuting. The definitions of these codes for 2010 census tracts are as follows:
Primary RUCA Codes, 2010
Code Definition
1 Metropolitan area core: primary flow within an urbanized area (UA)
2 Metropolitan area high commuting: primary flow 30% or more to a UA
3 Metropolitan area low commuting: primary flow 10% to 30% to a UA
4
Micropolitan area core: primary flow within an Urban Cluster of 10,000 to 49,999
(large UC)
5 Micropolitan high commuting: primary flow 30% or more to a large UC
6 Micropolitan low commuting: primary flow 10% to 30% to a large UC
7 Small town core: primary flow within an Urban Cluster of 2,500 to 9,999 (small UC)
8 Small town high commuting: primary flow 30% or more to a small UC
9 Small town low commuting: primary flow 10% to 30% to a small UC
10 Rural areas: primary flow to a tract outside a UA or UC
99 Not coded: Census tract has zero population and no rural-urban identifier information
When applied to 2010 census tracts, we can quantify the percentage of each county’s
tracts coded as “10” for rural. This is a fairly precise measurement of the percentage population
living in a rural environment, as each census tract is approximately 4,000 people. The results in
order from least to most rural can be found in Table 2 and visualized in Figure 2.
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The consolidation of Vermont’s lending industry can be quantified by looking at the ratio
of population to banks in 1980 versus today by county, as shown in Table 3. Table 4 shows the
percentage change in population versus the percentage change in people per bank over the
30-year period. Changes over a 30-year period show that, for many counties, the ratio of people
to banks skyrockets between 1980 and 2010, showing that there was a decreasing number of
locations from which people in these counties could access credit. In some counties, such as
Orleans and Windham, the ratio of people to banks grew by more than 50% over thirty years.
However, counties such as Essex, Franklin and Chittenden in the northwest portion of the state
experienced a decrease in their ratio.
ii. Distribution of Credit Unions
It is important to note that many Vermonters obtain credit from non-CRA regulated depository
institutions. Most often, this source is credit unions. Credit unions differ from banks in that their
services are only provided to their members and that they are non-profits run jointly by their
members (Cassity, 2000). Since 1982, credit unions have also been consolidating into large
depository (and lending) institutions, representing a major, less regulated force in the credit
market. When the CRA was passed in 1977, it included only depository institutions which were
federally insured, thus excluding credit unions. A great debate in the lending industry is whether
or not today’s credit unions should be regulated under the CRA, as many believe that credit
unions’ mission to serve their members makes such regulation unnecessary. While the lack of
regulation surrounding credit unions means their compliance in providing credit to low- and
moderate-income members of their community is less reliable, their importance in the credit
market makes them necessary to consider in this study. The same data and calculations done for
FDIC-insured depository institutions can be found in Tables 5 and 6.
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Interestingly, this data does not follow the same patterns as FDIC-insured depository
institutions. Counties like Addison, Franklin, and Essex, which saw substantial decreases in their
people per bank statistics, saw dramatic increases in their people per credit union statistics
between 1980 and 2010, with Essex losing its sole credit union during that time. Further,
Bennington and Orleans, two counties which saw increases in their people per bank statistic,
were the only counties which experienced decreases in people per credit union. This points
towards credit unions playing a greater role in rural counties outside the northwest portion of the
state between 1980 and 2010, at the same time as FDIC-insured depository institutions were
leaving those counties.
iii. Distribution of Depository Institutions
Tables 7 and 8 combine the previous two sections to show the concentration of depository
institutions compared to population by county in 1980 and 2010, the combined effect of bank
and credit union consolidation. The percent changes in people per depository institution by
county can also be visualized in Figure 3. It is important to note that, since credit unions are
included in this data, not all the institutions examined are regulated by the CRA and are therefore
not required by law to serve the needs of the communities they receive deposits from. The
second table shows the percent change in people per depository institution as well as population
over the thirty-year timespan. Notably, counties like Chittenden, Addison, and Franklin
experienced both significant relative increases in population as well as significant relative
decreases in people per depository institution. At the same time, counties like Caledonia and
Windham experience increases in people per depository institution which are relatively higher
than their increases in population. The geographic layout of change in people per depository
institution can be visualized in Figure 4.
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iv. Analysis of Loan Application Outcomes
Table 9 shows the impact of a consolidated banking industry on access to credit in rural places.
The figures were established using data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, and represents
the outcome of loan applications organized by census tract. The first data table shows the
percentage of census tracts in Vermont with a high loan origination rate that are coded as RUCA
code “10” for rural. In 2007, the top quartile of census tracts when organized by highest loan
origination rate was 17.78% rural, while the bottom quartile was 54.55% rural. The second
column of the table shows the same results using 2017 data. In 2017, the top quartile of census
tracts by loan origination rate was 10.87% rural, while the bottom quartile was rural 47.83%.
Thus, rural census tracts in 2007 dominated the lowest percentages of loan applications
originated and were less likely to have a high loan origination rate. This trend was reiterated in
2017. Differences between the statistics for 2007 and 2017 are likely due to credit market
changes in the wake of the subprime crisis.
Table 10 goes through the same process for loan denial data. The percentages listed show
the percentage of upper and lower quartile of loan denial rates coded as rural. The data shows
that rural census tracts dominate the upper quartile of loan denial rates in Vermont, and take up a
much smaller portion of the lower quartile.
Tables 11 and 12 show the rates of loan applications originated, approved but not
accepted, denied, withdrawn, closed for incompleteness, and purchased by institution in 2007
and 2017. The results reiterate the finding that rates of loan origination are much higher in urban
census tracts than rural, and rates of loan denial are much lower in urban tracts than rural.1
v. Regressions
1 Note: RUCA code “1” designates “most urban” while RUCA code “10” designates “most rural”
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It is clear that other factors besides a census tract’s status as rural or urban contribute to whether
a bank decides to originate a loan or not. The following regressions attempt to contextualize the
impact of a census tract’s rural status on its access to credit by including other variables which
could contribute to access to credit. The dependent variable in the first two regressions is percent
of loan applications originated by census tract in 2017, and the dependent variable in the second
two is the percent of loan applications denied. These dependent variables are intended to
represent access to credit for each census tract. The four independent variables are median
household income, educational attainment, percent of the population that’s non-white and RUCA
code.
The median household income data is collected from the 2010 Census, and is in 2010
inflation-adjusted dollars. I expect this variable to have a positive coefficient in the first two
regressions, as a loan applicant with a high income would most likely be seen by a depository
institution as a safer investment. I expect this coefficient to be negative in the second two
regressions for the same reasons. Educational attainment is measured by percent of census tract
residents who have their high school diploma (or equivalent) or have completed a higher level of
education. I expect this variable to have a positive coefficient in the first two regressions and a
negative coefficient in the second two, on the assumption that individuals with a higher
education level have better employment and therefore have better credit scores. Percent of the
population that is non-white is measured as 100 minus the percentage of the population that is
white. I expect this variable to be negative in the first two regressions and positive in the second
two, as there is a long history of racial discrimination in the credit market. The RUCA code
variable is the RUCA code assigned to each census tract. In the regressions in Tables 13 and 15,
each census tract has a RUCA code one through ten. This was done to reflect the effects of
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increasing RUCA codes on access to credit. In the regressions in Tables 14 and 16, RUCA code
is a dummy variable where census tracts coded as “10” for “rural” are assigned a “1” and all
other census tracts are assigned a “0.” This was done to isolate the effects of being coded as rural
on access to credit. Based on my analyses of HMDA data and the Tables listed earlier, I expect
both variables to be negative in the first two regressions and positive in the second two, as my
previous analysis seemed to show that census tracts with higher RUCA codes had lower loan
origination rates and higher denial rates.
The results of the regressions in which origination rate is the dependent variable are
consistent with my expectations. In the first two regressions, the coefficient on median
household income was positive but very small, at 8.822 in Table 13 and 12.241 in Table 14. This
suggests that an increase in a census tract’s median household income has a positive impact on
its loan origination rates. The p-value for median household income shows that it is statistically
significant at the 1% level in both regressions. The coefficient on educational attainment was
also positive, at 0.097 in Table 13 and 0.122 in Table 14. This suggests that higher educational
attainment among a census tract’s residents has a positive impact on loan origination rates. These
results were not significant at the 1% level but were significant at the 5% level. The coefficient
on percent of the population that’s non-white was positive in the first two regressions, at 0.753 in
Table 13 and 1.149 in Table 14, suggesting that tracts in Vermont with higher non-white
populations have higher loan origination rates. These results were significant at the 1% level.
The coefficient on RUCA code was negative in both regressions. In Table 13, the coefficient was
-1.002, which suggests that census tracts with a higher RUCA code have lower loan origination
rates. The coefficient on RUCA code in Table 14 was -2.803, suggesting that being coded as
RUCA code “10” for “rural” has an even greater negative impact on loan origination rates. The
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coefficient on RUCA code was significant at the 1% level for both regressions. These results can
be seen in full in Tables 13 and 14.
The results for the regressions in which loan denial rates were the dependent variable
were also similar to my predictions. In both Tables 15 and 16, the coefficient on median
household income was negative, indicating that an increase in a census tract’s median household
income is correlated with a decrease in its loan denial rate. In Table 15 this coefficient was
-8.814 and in Table 16 it was -10.768, with both coefficients significant at the 1% level. The
coefficient on educational attainment was also negative in Tables 15 and 16, though less
significant than median household income. In Table 15 the coefficient on educational attainment
was -0.059 and in Table 16 it was -0.068, with both coefficients being insignificant at the 1%
level but significant at 5%. The coefficient on percent of the population that’s non-white was
negative in Tables 15 and 16, indicating that census tracts with higher non-white populations
have lower loan denial rates in Vermont. The coefficient on percent of the population that’s
non-white was significant at the 1% level in both tables. The coefficients on both RUCA code
and the RUCA dummy variable were positive, indicating that a higher RUCA code and being
designated as a “rural” census tract is correlated with higher loan denial rates. In Table 15, the
coefficient on the RUCA code variable was 0.585, and in Table 16 the coefficient on the binary
RUCA variable was 1.772. While the coefficient on RUCA code was significant at the 1% level
in Table 15, it was only significant at the 5% level in Table 16. These results can be seen in full
in Tables 15 and 16.
VI. Discussion of Empirical Analysis
The results of my analysis of both the banking industry and HMDA data show that rural Vermont
has reduced access to credit compared to the rest of the state. “Access” is measured in two ways:
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presence of depository institutions, and percentage of loan applications originated or denied.
“Rural” is measured using Rural-Urban commuting codes, with code “10” denoting a rural
census tract, as indicated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The first part of my discussion
will involve proximity to a depository institution, while the second portion will involve my
analysis of HMDA data.
Interestingly, trends in percent change of people per depository institution seem to mirror
trends in counties with the highest percentage of its census tracts coded as “rural.” The three
counties with the biggest reductions in people per depository institution, Grand Isle, Franklin,
and Addison, also fall into the least rural half of Vermont counties, while the three counties with
the biggest increases in people per depository institution, Windham, Orleans and Caledonia, fall
into the most rural half. In fact, the average change in people per depository institution for the
least rural half of Vermont counties is -0.99%, while the average change for the most rural half is
18.84%. Further, Vermont’s seven least rural counties had an average 0.39% increase in people
per CRA-eligible depository institutions, while Vermont’s seven most rural counties had an
average 25.94% increase. All of these calculations point towards a general trend of more people
per depository institutions in rural counties, which indicates a lack of depository institutions for
rural people and greater exposure to “shadow banking.” As indicated by Ergungore (2010), this
suggests decreased access to credit for rural people as well.
In addition to the availability of lenders decreasing in rural Vermont and increasing in
non-rural places, analysis of HMDA data shows that rural applicants for loans are less likely to
have their loans originated and more likely to have them denied in the state of Vermont. This was
measured in multiple ways and over multiple years. In both 2007 and 2017 HMDA data, rural
census tracts were concentrated among census tracts with the lowest origination rates and the
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highest denial rates. In 2007, rural census tracts made up more than half of the tracts in the
lowest quartile of loan origination rates (meaning the 25% of tracts with the smallest percentage
of loan applications originated), while making up just 17.78% of the upper quartile. Ten years
later, in 2017, rural tracts made up 47.83% of the lowest quartile of loan origination rates and
10.87% of the highest. These numbers show that, in the ten years following the subprime crisis,
rural census tracts were less concentrated in the lowest loan origination rates but also less
concentrated in the highest loan origination rates.
A similar trend can be seen in loan denial rates. In 2007, the 48.89% of census tracts in
the highest quartile of loan denial rates were rural, while just 15.91% of the lowest quartile were
rural. Ten years later, in 2017, a smaller percentage of the upper quartile of loan denial rates
(41.30%) were rural, as well as a smaller percentage of the lowest quartile (11.90%) were rural.
These numbers show that rural census tracts were concentrated among census tracts with the
highest loan denial rates in both 2007 and 2017, as well as underrepresented among the lowest
loan denial rates.
More analysis further emphasizes this point. When organizing loan application outcomes
by RUCA code, the trend of higher rates of loan denials and lower rates of loan originations in
rural census tracts continues. In 2007, tracts in Vermont coded as RUCA code “1” or
“metropolitan area core” experienced a 53% loan origination rate, while tracts coded as “10” or
“rural” experienced a 45% origination rate. At the same time, RUCA code 1 had an 11% denial
rate, while RUCA code 10’s denial rate was 21%. It even seems that, the more rural a census
tract is, the less likely it is to have its loan applications originated and the more likely it is to
have them denied. As a tract’s RUCA code increases from one to ten, its population as well as
the number of people who commute there for work decrease, providing a general measure of a
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tract’s “rural-ness.” Interestingly, RUCA codes one through five have an average 51% loan
origination rate, while codes six through ten have a 46.2% average loan origination rate. Codes
one through five also had an average 15.4% loan application denial rate, while codes six through
ten had an average 21.2% denial rate.
Similar trends can be seen in the 2017 data. RUCA code one has an average 69% loan
origination rate, while RUCA code ten has an average 54%. RUCA code one has an average 8%
loan denial rate in 2017, while RUCA code ten average 18%. Codes one through five had an
average 62% loan origination rate and 11.2% loan denial rate, while codes six through ten had an
average 49.6% origination rate and 20.8% denial rate. All of these statistics go to show that, in
both 2007 and 2017, not only were there stark differences in outcomes for loan applications in
rural versus urban census tracts, but loan application outcomes became generally less favorable
as a census tract increased in RUCA code and can therefore be considered “more rural.”
Regressions which used loan origination and denial rates as dependent variables and
included RUCA data as well as other potential indicators of loan outcome as independent
variables show further that a tract’s status as rural has a negative impact on its residents’ ability
to obtain a loan. The regressions used data from the 2010 census as well as 2017 loan origination
and denial rates. Two regressions were run with origination rates as a dependent variable and two
with denial rates as a dependent variable. For both dependent variables, one regression used
RUCA codes one through ten as an independent variable, and another converted the RUCA code
to a binary variable in which census tracts which were coded as “10” received a one, and the rest
of the tracts received a zero.
In both regressions which used origination rates as a dependent variable, median
household income and educational attainment had a positive coefficient, indicating that these
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variables are correlated with higher loan origination rates, while percent of the population which
is non-white had a negative coefficient. The coefficient on the RUCA code variable when using
codes one through ten was -1.002, indicating that increasing RUCA code values have a negative
impact on loan origination rates. The coefficient on the binary RUCA code variable was -2.803,
which indicates that being designated as a rural census tract has a strong negative impact on the
tract’s loan origination rate.
In both regressions which used denial rates as a dependent variable, the signs on all
coefficients were switched. Median household income and educational attainment both had
negative coefficients, while the coefficient on percent of the population that’s non-white was
positive. The coefficient on the RUCA code variable when using codes one through ten was
0.585, indicating that increasing RUCA values have a positive impact on loan denial rates. The
coefficient on the binary RUCA code variable was 1.772, which indicates that being designated
as a rural census tract has a strong positive impact on the tract’s loan denial rate.
VII. Conclusions
The analysis conducted in this thesis ultimately shows that rural census tracts have a reduced
access to credit in Vermont. This was shown through both a decreasing availability of depository
institutions in rural places, which has been associated with decreased access to credit, as well as
through an analysis of HMDA data from before and after the subprime crisis. The analysis of
HMDA data shows that rural census tracts are concentrated among the lowest rates of loan
origination, as well as the highest loan denial rates. This indication of rural tracts’ relative
inability to receive credit is reiterated when examining loan origination and denial rates by
RUCA code. Code “10” for “rural” experienced lower loan origination rates and higher loan
denial rates than code “1” for “metropolitan area core” in both 2007 and 2017. Further, the
25
average rate of loan applications originated decreases as a tract’s RUCA code increases, and the
rate of applications denied increases. This is an indication of reduced access to credit for rural
places, because RUCA codes increase as both population and commuters to a census tract for
work decrease. Finally, regressions which test RUCA code as well as other contributing factors
on loan origination and denial rates confirm that, while there are other contributing factors, being
rural has a negative impact on loan application outcomes, suggesting a lack of credit access in
these census tracts.
Ultimately, the results of this thesis indicate that credit needs in Vermont are not
adequately met in rural census tracts relative to those of urban tracts, and that progress can be
made in the field of rural lending in this state. Although this progress could come from a number
of sources, the natural place to start would be the Community Reinvestment Act. As a piece of
legislation designed to address problems in urban lending, the results of this paper suggest that,
in the state of Vermont, the reforms initiated were less inclusive of rural people. This paper
leaves the opportunity for further research on the topic of rural access to credit nationally and in
other states, as well as for further research into which rural communities are least likely to have
their credit needs met, and the factors which contribute to rural credit inequalities.
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Table 1: Vermont-Chartered Bank and Deposit History
Year




1980 23 2482502 4.81
1985 19 3286557 6.15
1990 21 4654720 8.25
1995 17 4483100 7.69
2000 10 4337247 7.25
2005 9 5371311 8.68
2010 7 2887730 4.64
2019 6 2655971 4.26
Data taken from the Vermont Department of Financial Regulation. “Number of Banks in
Operation” refers to the number of Vermont-Chartered Banks, while “Total Deposits” refer to
the total deposits in Vermont-chartered banks.
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Table 2: Percentage of Census Tracts Rural In Vermont By County















Calculations made using RUCA code and census tract data published by the United States
Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service
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Table 3: CRA-Eligible Depository Institutions vs. Population By County
1980 County Population Banks People Per Bank 2010 Population Banks People Per Bank
Addison 29406 6 4901 36823 11 3348
Bennington 33345 14 2382 37078 13 2852
Caledonia 25808 13 1985 31166 12 2597
Chittenden 115534 35 3301 156769 52 3015
Essex 6313 1 6313 6312 2 3156
Franklin 34788 7 4969 47821 20 2391
Grand Isle 4613 1 4613 6948 1 6948
Lamoille 16767 6 2794 24515 7 4903
Orange 22739 8 2842 28944 11 2894
Orleans 23440 7 3348 27245 5 5449
Rutland 58347 17 3432 61586 17 4106
Washington 52393 19 2758 59570 24 2590
Windham 36933 21 1759 44502 13 3179
Windsor 51030 23 2219 56600 27 2021
Vermont 512456 178 2879 625879 215 2911
1980 bank data taken from the 1980 Annual Report Of The Bank Commissioner Of The State of
Vermont For The Year EndedDecember 31st, 1980. 2010 banks taken from The Vermont
Department of Financial Regulation, and locations found using the banks’ websites. Population
data taken from the Census Bureau.
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Table 4: Change In Population Vs. Change In People Per Bank By County
















1980 Bank data taken from the 1980 Annual Report Of The Bank Commissioner Of The State of
Vermont For The Year EndedDecember 31st, 1980. 2010 banks taken from the Vermont
Department of Financial Regulation, and locations obtained from the banks’ websites.
Population data taken from the Census Bureau.
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Addison 29406 3 9802 36823 3 12274.33
Bennington 33345 2 16672.5 37078 3 12359.33
Caledonia 25808 6 4301.33 31166 3 10388.67
Chittenden 115534 14 8252.43 156769 19 8251
Essex 6313 1 6313 6312 0 No Credit Unions
Franklin 34788 6 5798 47821 3 15940.33
Grand Isle 4613 0 No Credit Unions 6948 1 6948
Lamoille 16767 1 16767 24515 1 24515
Orange 22739 1 22739 28944 1 28944
Orleans 23440 4 5860 27245 5 5449
Rutland 58347 8 7293.38 61586 8 7698.25
Washington 52393 15 3492.87 59570 12 4964.17
Windham 36933 7 5276.14 44502 7 6357.43
Windsor 51030 11 4639.09 56600 11 5145.45
Vermont 512456 79 6486.78 625879 77 8128.30
1980 credit union data taken from the 1980 Annual Report Of The Bank Commissioner Of The
State of Vermont For The Year Ended December 31st, 1980. 2010 credit unions taken from The
Vermont Department of Financial Regulation, and locations obtained from the credit unions’
websites. Population data taken from the Census Bureau.
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Table 6: Change In Population Vs. Change In People Per Credit Union By County
















1980 bank data taken from the 1980 Annual Report Of The Bank Commissioner Of The State of
Vermont For The Year EndedDecember 31st, 1980. 2010 bank data taken from The Vermont
Department of Financial Regulation. Population data taken from the Census Bureau.
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Addison 29406 9 3267.33 36823 14 2630.21
Bennington 33345 16 2084.06 37078 16 2317.38
Caledonia 25808 19 1358.32 31166 15 2077.73
Chittenden 115534 49 2357.84 156769 71 2208.01
Essex 6313 2 3156.50 6312 2 3156
Franklin 34788 13 2676 47821 23 2079.17
Grand Isle 4613 1 4613 6948 2 3474
Lamoille 16767 7 2395.29 24515 8 3064.38
Orange 22739 9 2526.56 28944 12 2412
Orleans 23440 11 2130.91 27245 10 2724.50
Rutland 58347 25 2333.88 61586 25 2463.44
Washington 52393 34 1540.97 59570 36 1654.72
Windham 36933 28 1319.04 44502 20 2225.10
Windsor 51030 34 1500.88 56600 38 1489.47
Vermont 512456 257 1993.99 625879 292 2143.42
1980 depository institution data taken from the 1980 Annual Report Of The Bank Commissioner
Of The State of Vermont For The Year EndedDecember 31st, 1980. 2010 depository institutions
taken from The Vermont Department of Financial Regulation, and locations obtained from the
depository institutions’ websites. Population data taken from the Census Bureau.
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Table 8: Change In Population Vs. Change In People Per Depository Institution By County
















1980 depository institution data taken from the 1980 Annual Report Of The Bank Commissioner
Of The State of Vermont For The Year Ended December 31st, 1980. 2010 depository institution
data taken from The Vermont Department of Financial Regulation. Population data taken from
the Census Bureau.
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Table 9: Representation of Rural Census Tracts in The Upper, and Lower Quartile of Loan
Origination Rates in Vermont
2007 2017
Percent of Upper Quartile
Coded As Rural
Loan origination rates
>51.66%  in 2007, >64.88%
in 2017
17.78% 10.87%
Percent of Lower Quartile
Coded As Rural
Loan origination rate <42.51
in 2007, <50.96% in 2017
54.55% 47.83%
Loan application outcome statistics derived using Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Data. RUCA
codes obtained from the United States Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service.
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Table 10: Representation of Rural Census Tracts in The Upper and Lower Quartile of
Loan Denial Rates in Vermont
2007 2017
Percent of Upper Quartile
Coded As Rural
Loan denial rate >23.06% in
2007, >19.67% in 2017
48.89% 41.30%
Percent of Lower Quartile
Coded As Rural
Loan denial rate <14.12% in
2007, <10.23% in 2017
15.91% 11.90%
Loan application outcome statistics derived using Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Data. RUCA
codes obtained from the United States Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service.
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1 9317 53% 06% 11% 08% 02% 19%
2 4147 51% 06% 15% 09% 03% 16%
3 233 55% 05% 13% 12% 03% 13%
4 4014 47% 07% 19% 10% 02% 15%
5 3635 46% 07% 19% 10% 02% 16%
6 190 44% 08% 24% 12% 02% 12%
7 4255 45% 07% 22% 09% 02% 13%
8 2526 45% 08% 23% 11% 03% 12%
9 605 52% 08% 16% 07% 01% 16%
10 14494 45% 08% 21% 10% 02% 14%
Loan application outcome statistics derived using Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Data. RUCA
codes obtained from the United States Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service.
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1 4444 69% 02% 08% 11% 03% 07%
2 3190 65% 03% 11% 11% 03% 07%
3 224 64% 02% 15% 11% 03% 06%
4 1902 57% 03% 15% 11% 03% 12%
5 1681 55% 03% 16% 12% 04% 09%
6 124 40% 03% 23% 14% 06% 13%
7 2441 54% 03% 17% 12% 04% 10%
8 1476 54% 03% 17% 11% 04% 11%
9 60 46% 04% 29% 04% 04% 13%
10 6739 54% 03% 18% 11% 04% 10%
Loan application outcome statistics derived using Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Data. RUCA
codes obtained from the United States Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service.
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Table 13: Regression Results - Loan Origination Rate By Tract Is Dependent Variable1
Coefficient













Robust Standard Errors in parentheses: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
1. Dependent variable is percentage of loan applications originated by census tract,
measured using 2017 HMDA data.
2. Median Household Income is the natural log of the tract’s median household
income in 2010. Data taken from the Census Bureau
3. Educational attainment data calculated by adding the percentage of the
population that completed high school (or equivalent) to those with higher levels
of education. This was done using data from the Census Bureau.
4. RUCA codes established using data published by the United States Department of
Agriculture’s Economic Research Service.
5. Percent Non-White is calculated as one hundred minus the percentage of the
population that’s white in 2010. This was done using data from the Census
Bureau.
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Table 14: Binary Regression Results - Loan Origination Rate By Tract Is Dependent
Variable1
Coefficient













Robust Standard Errors in parentheses: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
1. Dependent variable is percentage of loan applications originated by census tract,
measured using 2017 HMDA data.
2. Median Household Income is the natural log of the tract’s median household
income in 2010. Data taken from the Census Bureau
3. Educational attainment data calculated by adding the percentage of the
population that completed high school (or equivalent) to those with higher levels
of education. This was done using data from the Census Bureau.
4. Binary RUCA code constructed by assigning a “1” to census tracts coded as
rural, and a “0” to all other tracts. This was done using data published by the
United States Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service.
5. Percent Non-White is calculated as one hundred minus the percentage of the
population that’s white in 2010. This was done using data from the Census
Bureau.
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Table 15: Regression Results - Loan Denial Rate By Tract Is Dependent Variable5
Coefficient













Robust Standard Errors in parentheses: *p<0.10, *p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
6. Dependent variable is the percentage of loan applications denied by census tract,
measured using 2017 HMDA data.
7. Median Household Income is the natural log of the tract’s median household
income in 2010. data taken from the Census Bureau.
6. Educational attainment data calculated by adding the percentage of the
population that completed high school (or equivalent) to those with higher levels
of education. This was done using data from the Census Bureau.
7. RUCA codes established using data published by the United States Department of
Agriculture’s Economic Research Service.
8. Percent Non-White is calculated as one hundred minus the percentage of the
population that’s white in 2010. This was done using data from the Census
Bureau.
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Table 16: Binary Regression Results - Loan Denial Rate By Tract Is Dependent
Variable5
Coefficient













Robust Standard Errors in parentheses: *p<0.10, *p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
8. Dependent variable is the percentage of loan applications denied by census tract,
measured using 2017 HMDA data.
9. Median Household Income is the natural log of the tract’s median household
income in 2010. data taken from the Census Bureau.
10. Educational attainment data calculated by adding the percentage of the
population that completed high school (or equivalent) to those with higher levels
of education. This was done using data from the Census Bureau.
11. Binary RUCA code constructed by assigning a “1” to census tracts coded as
rural, and a “0” to all other tracts. This was done using data published by the
United States Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service.
12. Percent Non-White is calculated as one hundred minus the percentage of the




Calculations made using RUCA code and census tract data published by the United States
Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service
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Figure 2
Data taken from the Vermont Department of Financial Regulation. “Number of Banks” refers to
the number of Vermont-Chartered Banks, while “Deposits Per Capita” refers to the total
deposits in Vermont-chartered banks divided by population.
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Figure 3
1980 depository institution data taken from the 1980 Annual Report Of The Bank Commissioner
Of The State of Vermont For The Year Ended December 31st, 1980. 2010 depository institution
data taken from The Vermont Department of Financial Regulation. Population data taken from
the Census Bureau. County boundary shapefile obtained from the Vermont Open Geodata Portal
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Figure 4
1980 depository institution data taken from the 1980 Annual Report Of The Bank Commissioner
Of The State of Vermont For The Year Ended December 31st, 1980. 2010 depository institution
data taken from The Vermont Department of Financial Regulation. Population data taken from
the Census Bureau.
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